Abstract. We have demonstrated point-to-point single-photon quantum key distribution (QKD) over a free-space optical path of -475 m under daylight conditions. This represents an increase of >1 ,000 times farther than any reported point-to-point demonstration [1] , and >6 times farther than the previous folded path daylight demonstration [2] . We expect to extend the daylight range to 2 km or more within the next few months. A brief description of the system is given here.
the warm detector tells Bob when to expect the dim-pulse allowing him to watch for one of his SPCMs to fire within the temporally narrow coincidence window (<5 ns). (Note: Alice transmits the dim-pulses before the timing-pulse to minimize noise caused by reflections within the system, but Bob detects the bright-pulse before the dim-pulse by using MM fibers of differing lengths.) If Bob's upper path polarizer (Fig. 2 ) is oriented to transmit horizontally polarized photons, h), and if Alice sends a single I v) photon, Bob collects it andit travels along the upper path, then the upper path polarization controller can be adjusted to convert I v) to I -45) leading to a 50% detection probability at the upper path SPCM; however, a single I 45) polarized photon traveling this path is converted to I v) and absorbed by the polarizer in this path. Similarly, if Alice sends a single 45) photon and it travels along the lower path, the polarization controller can be adjusted so that it leaves the 45) unchanged (zero wave retardation) leading to a 50% detection probability at the lower path SPCM; similarly, a single I v) polarized photon traveling this path is unchanged but reflected away from the SPCM in this path by the PBS. Thus, Bob determines a random 25% portion of the random states (key-bits) transmitted by Alice by testing for superposed single-photon states. This 25% efficiency is the price Alice and Bob must pay for secrecy in the B92 protocol [3] . (The preceding discussion assumes single-photon Fock states on transmission, and perfect receiver optics and single-photon detectability.) We tested out our QKD system down to an average dim-pulse photon number ofi 0.3 during daytime operation (16:3O on 19 November 1998). The ambient background noise rate was 2xlO5, or 20 dark counts out of 1 million coincidence tests. [Note (1): the attenuated pulse only approximates a "single-photon" Fock state. Dim-pulses ofi 0.3 will have a 2-photon probability of -O.O4, implying that -l8 ofevery 100 detectable pulses will contain more than one photon. Note (2): we measured n at the transmitter after calculating at the receiver from data collected during nighttime experiments (not discussed here). Based on similar reasonable assumptions, we calculated n 0.3 with data collected during the daytime experiments.]
Bit exchange is completed when Bob openly communicates the locations, but not the values, of his photon detections in Alice's random bit string. The non-orthogonal basis states ensure eavesdropping will be detected by the elevated error rate caused by the irreversible collapse of the wave-function [4] . A cornplete QKD system will incorporate signature authentication and privacy amplification [5] protocols.
The daytime optical coupling efficiency between the transmitter and receiver was T -0. 15 and accounts for losses between the transmitter and MM fibers at the receiver. The 0.25 efficiency of B92 (iQ) and the detectors' efficiencies (1D 0.6) lower the overall system efficiency to -..O.022, and leads to a detection probability for Bob of B = exp(-T.TQ.1D.i). The key-rate was -7 kHz at n 0.3 photon per dimpulse when the lasers were pulsed at R = 1 MHz. The average bit error rate was -1.5%.
We have demonstrated practical point-to-point free-space QKD over --475 m through a turbulent medium under daylight conditions, and have described a passive QKD transmitter and receiver that provides a secure method to secretly communicate with a simple system based on the B92 protocol. A more detailed discussion of the methods, reconciliation and error detection protocols, B92 protocol weaknesses, and important physics related to quantum cryptography and surface-to-satellite QKD can be
